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THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF 
DUAL FEDERALISM 
ERNEST A. YOUNG 
It may seem strange that, more than sixty years after Edward Cor-
win famously lamented "The Passing of Dual Federalism,"1 this 
essay is part of a panel organized under the title "Against Dual 
Federalism." Accusations that the Court was trying to revive fed-
eralism were commonplace in the early years of the Rehnquist 
Court's "federalist revival." I argued more than a decade ago that 
these charges were misplaced, and that the actual doctrines that 
the Court was articulating in cases like United States v. Lopez2 and 
Printz v. United States^ could not really fit into the rubric of dual 
federalism.4 It is not that I'm surprised to find that my counsel has 
not been universally heeded; I have, after all, two teenage chil-
dren. But I would think that by now the Court has made clear that 
it does not mean to impose particularly significant limits on the 
Commerce Clause,5 much less to bring back the entire dual feder-
alist regime. Dual federalism remains hardly less dead than it was 
the day after the Court decided Wickard v. Filburn6—a case that 
the Rehnquist Court repeatedly went out of its way to reaffirm and 
that the Roberts Court has not questioned. 
Part of the problem is that not everyone means the same thing 
by "dual federalism." The legal literature on federalism uses the 
term to describe a particular model of allocating functions be-
tween the national government and the states, characterized by an 
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attempt to define separate and exclusive spheres for national and 
state action.7 That model, I shall argue, is largely dead insofar as it 
operates as a check on national action; it survives, in a somewhat 
softer form, as a check on state action. But the latter aspect—dual 
federalism as a way of protecting national authority from incur-
sions by the states—is not what generally concerns dual federal-
ism's critics. 
Those critics frequently equate "dual federalism" with any effort 
to impose constitutional federalism-based limitations on national 
authority. In the essay to which this commentary responds, for 
example, Sotirios Barber contrasts dual federalism with "Marshall-
ian federalism," which he takes to be equivalent to the manage-
rial "decentralization" model long advocated by Malcolm Feeley 
and Edward Rubin.8 This sort of position objects not only to a 
"separate spheres" model but to any model of federalism featuring 
guarantees of state autonomy that are constitutionally entrenched. 
Conflating concepts in this way, however, tends not only to confuse 
discussion but also to obscure the reasons that some approaches to 
federalism fail while others have more staying power. 
This essay considers two ways in which notions of dual federal-
ism persist. The first is the tendency of commentators to insist 
that the Supreme Court is bent on reviving strict dual federal-
ist limits on national power, even when what the Court actually 
says and does makes rather clear that it is not. This persistence, 
in other words, is in the minds of the Court's critics—including 
Professor Barber, in his essay for this book. The second mode 
of persistence, however, is reflected in the Court's rhetoric and 
doctrine. That is the use of dual federalist notions to limit state 
power, by defining distinct and exclusive spheres of national reg-
ulatory activity. In preemption cases, for example, courts have 
found state law more readily preempted when it intrudes on a 
sphere of uniquely national concern, such as foreign relations 
or immigration. 
I contend that the Court's critics are right to condemn dual fed-
eralism, but wrong to think that the Court has revived dual fed-
eralist limits on national power. Properly defined, "dual federal-
ism" connotes separate and exclusive spheres of state and federal 
authority; it thus exists in contrast to other models of federalism, 
such as "cooperative" federalism, "collective action" federalism, 
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and "process" federalism. All of these models may rely on princi-
ples of dual sovereignty—that is, the broader notion that guarantees 
of state autonomy vis-a-vis the center should be constitutionally 
entrenched. While the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have revived 
this broader principle, they have not attempted to define a sepa-
rate sphere of state authority that the national government can-
not enter. 
Dual federalism died in the middle of the twentieth century 
because the Court found itself unable to draw determinate lines to 
define the exclusive sphere of state authority into which national 
power might not enter. That problem applies equally, however, 
to attempts to define and police an exclusive sphere of national 
authority; it thus plagues the contemporary cases in which courts 
have sought to keep states out of "uniquely federal" fields like 
foreign affairs, national banking, or immigration. But the line-
drawing problem is not inherent in all efforts to protect other 
forms of state sovereignty; I thus reject Professor Barber's more 
general critique of dual sovereignty in all its forms. If we are to 
keep faith with our constitutional commitments, then federalism 
is not optional. As Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge have writ-
ten, " [c] onstitutional law must make some sense of federalism."9 
1. SOME DEFINITIONS 
It will help to begin by defining some terms. Words like "dual fed-
eralism" are used in a variety of ways in the literature, and I do 
not mean to suggest that the definitions offered here are the only 
plausible ones. I do think that the conceptual distinctions drawn 
here matter, both theoretically and practically, and that whatever 
terms we happen to use, it will help to be more explicit about pre-
cisely what we mean. 
"Dual Federalism " versus "Dual Sovereignty " 
Alpheus Mason described "dual federalism" as contemplating "two 
mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of power—that 
of the national government and of the States. The two authori-
ties confront each other as equals across a precise constitutional 
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line, defining their respective jurisdictions."10 In his famous essay, 
Edward Corwin said that dual federalism entailed four "postulates": 
[1.] The national government is one of enumerated powers only; 2. 
Also the purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; 3. 
Within their respective spheres the two centers of government are 
"sovereign" and hence "equal"; 4. The relation of the two centers 
with each other is one of tension rather than collaboration." 
Although Professor Corwin's postulates are somewhat more elab-
orate than Mason's definition, both statements share a common 
theme: Article I's limits on Congress's powers and purposes (pos-
tulates 1 and 2) define separate "spheres" of sovereignty for the 
federal and state governments (postulate 3), neither of which per-
mits intrusion or activity by the other level of government (postu-
late 4). It is this notion of separate "spheres" or "enclaves" that has 
set dual federalism apart from other approaches to federalism for 
later generations of commentators.12 
I want to distinguish dual federalism from dual sovereignty, al-
though I acknowledge that the two terms are often used inter-
changeably. While dual federalism refers to a particular relation-
ship between national and state authorities, I use "dual sovereignty" 
more generally to describe the Federalists' great innovation in 
political theory, which accommodated the separate authority of 
the states to classical political theory's requirement of a single "sov-
ereign" in every polity by lodging that ultimate sovereignty in the 
American people.13 As Justice Souter has explained, "[T]he Peo-
ple possessing this plenary bundle of specific powers were free to 
parcel them out to different governments and different branches 
of the same government as they saw fit."14 Dual sovereignty thus 
means that the federal and state governments are "each sovereign, 
with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign 
with respect to the objects committed to the other."15 
There is, of course, much disagreement about the precise mean-
ing of what Robert Cover and Alex Aleinikoff called "the lawyer's 
disease of sovereignty."16 In our constitutional system, neither the 
national government nor the states possess the sort of unquestion-
able ultimate authority that the European theorists of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries meant by "sovereignty."17 The 
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Federalists thus used "dual sovereignty" as something of a debat-
ing point, co-opting the rhetoric of their opponents while advo-
cating something completely different from the traditional unitary 
authority of the king in Parliament.18 And "sovereignty" is an even 
more contested term in our contemporary political environment, 
constandy under threat from policy concerns that disrespect ter-
ritorial boundaries, broad conceptions of individual rights against 
government, the proliferation of international law and institu-
tions, and the rise of complex intergovernmental institutional ar-
rangements that blur traditional jurisdictional lines.19 
Nonetheless, "dual sovereignty" does capture an important truth 
about American federalism: although nonfederal regimes may 
make the political choice to decentralize certain functions, the 
"sovereignty" of the states and the federal government means that 
at least some elements of the American allocation of authority are 
enforceable as a matter of legal right. This, for Edward Rubin and 
Malcolm Feeley, is the key distinction between "federalism" and 
"decentralization."20 What "dual sovereignty" means in practice is 
that the federal arrangement is constitutionally entrenched— that is, 
it cannot be changed without constitutional amendment, which is 
of course very difficult to do.21 
This element of entrenchment is critical to a wide range of defi-
nitions of federalism in both law and political science. Jenna Bed-
nar, for example, defines a federal system as one meeting "three 
structural criteria"—geopolitical division according territory to 
each state unit, independent electoral bases of authority for state 
and national governments, and "policy sovereignty" for each level 
of government over some issues.22 Importantly, she presumes that 
each of these structural characteristics must be constitutionally 
entrenched.23 And the Supreme Court, of course, has long main-
tained that "'the preservation of the States, and the maintenance 
of their governments, are as much within the design and care of 
the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the main-
tenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all its 
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of inde-
structible States.' "24 
Much of our federalism, of course, is not entrenched. As I have 
argued elsewhere, in many ways the most practically important 
boundaries between, national and state authority are set by federal 
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statutes, agency regulations, or even defeasible judicial doctrines 
like the dormant Commerce Clause,25 and perhaps it would be bet-
ter if we spent more time talking about those arrangements and 
less time arguing about sovereignty.26 But as will be apparent, it 
remains an important point of division in debates about federal-
ism whether any element of the federal arrangement is not subject 
to change through ordinary law. 
Professor Barber seems to mean something like dual sover-
eignty when he says "dual federalism." He says, for instance, that 
"[d]ual federalism . . . sees the Constitution as a collection of 
restraints on the national government, one kind of restraint being 
'states' rights.' "27 This is hardly the only thing that dual sovereignty 
means; as I have argued elsewhere, the point of state sovereignty is 
not simply to limit national power but also to preserve the states' 
ability to provide beneficial regulation and governmental services 
to their citizens.28 But the key difference between dual sovereignty 
and the model of managerial decentralization proposed by Pro-
fessors Feeley and Rubin is whether states do, in fact, have legally 
enforceable "rights" against the national authority. When Barber 
argues in favor of a national "authority to delegate and recall 
responsibility"29 vis-a-vis the states, he is arguing not only against 
dual federalism but against dual sovereignty as well. 
The key point for present purposes is that "dual sovereignty" 
is a broader term than "dual federalism"; the former holds that 
ultimate authority is split between two types of governments in our 
political system, while the latter describes a particular model for 
what that division of authority might look like. Defining separate 
and exclusive spheres of state and national authority is one way to 
maintain a regime of dual sovereignty, but as I discuss in the next 
section, there are others as well.30 We might, for instance, focus on 
the institutional integrity of state governments themselves, or on 
the political mechanisms by which their interests are represented 
in the political process. 
Professor Barber is thus right to argue that "the dual federalist 
view . . . is an option to be weighed against competing options; it's 
not a conclusion compelled by constitutional language, logic, or 
history."31 But that is correct only in the limited sense in which I 
am using "dual federalism" here. That model is one among sev-
eral that is consistent with "constitutional language, logic, [and] 
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history." But to the extent that Barber is using "dual federalism" 
in a broader sense—that is, to connote a commitment to some 
meaningful principle of state sovereignty and a "limited [national] 
government" vis-a-vis the states—that commitment is not constitu-
tionally optional.32 This is well-trod ground in the literature, and 
surely any assertion that the Constitution contains no such princir 
pie ought to grapple with the great weight of both jurisprudential 
and scholarly authority to the contrary.33 
In rejecting any entrenched notion of dual sovereignty, Profes-
sor Barber relies on Madison's statement that "as far as the sover-
eignty of the states cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the 
people . . . let the former be sacrificed to the latter."34 It is critical 
to remember, however, that Madison was arguing at a stage when 
the Constitution had not yet been adopted. After all, he said the 
same thing about the Constitution itself ("Were the plan of the 
Convention adverse to the public happiness, my advice would be, 
reject the plan.") and the Union ("Were the Union itself incon-
sistent with the public happiness, [my advice] would be, abolish 
the Union.").35 The people having made their choice to adopt the 
set of institutional arrangements offered in the Philadelphia draft 
(including a significant measure of state sovereignty), one can no 
longer repair directly to the public welfare as a reason to reject, 
state sovereignty without disregarding the binding force of the 
Constitution as law.36 
This disagreement may simply reflect a difference (at least in 
emphasis) between my job, as a professor of law, and Professor 
Barber's, as a professor of political science. Law has a more lim-
ited scope than political science for arguments directly from gen-
eral principles of public welfare. As Justice O'Connor observed in 
New York v. United States, "[o]ur task would be the same even if one 
could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It 
consists not of devising our preferred system of government, but 
of understanding and applying the framework set forth in the 
Constitution."37 It is thus all well and good to argue that a system of 
nonentrenched decentralization would better pursue particularly 
national conceptions of liberty and other values, but lawyers and 
judges are limited by obligations of fidelity to the law that stand 
apart from these values.38 
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Alternatives to Dual Federalism 
Dual federalism provided the model for our law of intergovern-
mental relations for roughly the first century and a half of our 
national existence. It died, for reasons I shall canvass shortly, in 
the New Deal revolution of 1937. And in truth, for much of the 
time since 1937 there has seemed to be little left of dual sovereignty 
either, as the Supreme Court has frequently seemed reluctant to 
enforce any constitutional limits on national authority. As I have 
already suggested, however, dual sovereignty-based limits can take 
a variety of forms that do not involve an attempt to define and 
police separate and exclusive spheres of state and national author-
ity. I sketch some of those alternative models in this section. I 
begin, however, with the nationalist model that Professor Barber 
appears to advocate. 
Managerial Decentralization or "Marshallian Federalism" 
It is a little hard to know for sure what Professor Barber means by 
"Marshallian federalism." He offers a definition at the outset of his 
essay: "Marshallian federalism holds that when the nation's govern-
ment is pursuing authorized constitutional ends it may freely dis-
regard the reserved powers of the states."39 But that formulation is 
perfectly consistent with "dual federalism" as it has been described 
in the literature and practiced by the Court; everything turns, of 
course, on what "constitutional ends" the national government is 
"authorized" to pursue. Dual federalism held that those ends are 
confined to a distinct sphere of governmental activity, but because 
that sphere is exclusive, the states could have no reserved powers 
to get in the way. If Barber's target is simply the notion that a state 
may interpose its own law to block the effect of a national law that 
falls within Congress's enumerated powers, then he is truly push-
ing on an open door. 
It is clear from Professor Barber's discussion, I think, that he 
means something more restrictive than this. Throughout his essay, 
he decries the notion of enforceable "states' rights" and urges 
that the national authority should be able to pursue national 
ends—like liberty or democracy—by calibrating the allocation of 
power between national and state institutions as the circumstances 
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dictate.40 The implicit assumption seems to be that the national 
government will always be "better" on issues of democracy than 
those of the states. While that is certainly sometimes true, it has no t 
always b e e n the case.41 Recognizing this reality, Alexander Ham-
ilton (not exactly a states' r ighter) emphasized the need for both 
state and nat ional governments to serve as checks on one another : 
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general govern-
ment will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the 
state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards 
the general government. . . . If [the people's] rights are invaded by 
either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.42 
Professor Barber, by contrast, would dispense with the states' check-
ing function. His federalism, like Professors Rubin and Feeley's 
decentralization, "is a managerial concept," no t a mat ter of con-
stitutional principle; Barber 's polity, like theirs, is "hierarchically 
organized and the leaders at the top or center have plenary power 
over the o the r member s of the organization."43 This view, whatever 
its merits, is the antithesis of dual sovereignty. 
More fundamentally, Professors Rubin and Feeley have argued 
that "the point of federalism"—as opposed to decentral izat ion— 
"is to allow normative disagreement amongst the subordinate units 
so that different units can subscribe to different value systems."44 
But it is the very possibility of legitimate normative disagreement 
that Professor Barber seems to reject: 
Locating constitutional authority in one place, instead of thirteen 
or fifty, is necessary because the decision to delegate discretion or 
recall it must flow from one judgment regarding ends and means. 
Liberty is best served if the best feasible conception of liberty is 
served. Some authority has to judge among competing conceptions 
in particular situations. . . . One institution is obviously superior to 
many because to be effective many institutions would have to con-
cur in one conclusion or one consistent set of conclusions regard-
ing means and ends.45 
O n e wonders if the American political system is really set u p to 
r ende r such a unitary concept ion of the good, even if we disregard 
the states. Not only is Congress a "they," no t an "it,"46 with noto-
riously multifarious and discordant concept ions of the good, but 
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the national separation of powers envisions perpetual compet i t ion 
between legislative, executive, and judicial institutions that may 
each harbor its own conceptions of liberty, democracy, or good 
policy. In any event, when Barber argues that our constitutional 
structure entails "a substantive c o m m i t m e n t — a n overarching and 
controlling view of the good life within which subordinate views 
must find a place as contr ibut ing views,"47 he plainly takes issue 
not only with the narrow model of "dual federalism" bu t with any 
model that envisions constitutional restraints on national author-
ity vis-a-vis the states. Tha t puts Barber squarely in the Rubin and 
Feeley camp. 
Professor Barber describes his view as "Marshallian federalism," 
but the position he describes is plainly no t J o h n Marshall's feder-
alism. Barber provides no evidence for his claim that "Marshall's 
constitutionalism would commit the nat ion to a more-or-less spe^ 
cine way of life."48 O the r students of Marshall have concluded that 
"a constitution . . . is m a d e for people of fundamentally differ-
ing views."49 More to the point, Chief Justice Marshall repeatedly 
insisted that the Constitution limits national power. In McCulloch, 
for example, Marshall warned that " [s jhould Congress, in the 
execution of its powers, adop t measures which are prohibi ted by 
the constitution; or should Congress, u n d e r the pretext of execut-
ing its powers, pass laws for the accompl ishment of objects no t 
entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty 
of this tr ibunal . . . to say that such an act was not the law of the 
land."50 And in Gibbons, Marshall went so far as to articulate no t 
simply dual sovereignty bu t the "separate spheres" not ion of dual 
federalism typical of his age: 
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that 
its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, 
and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but 
not to those which are completely within a particular State, which 
do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to 
interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers 
of the government. The completely internal commerce of a State, 
then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself.51 
It is certainly true that the thrust of the Great Chief Justice's 
federalism decisions was to carve out a place for the fledgling 
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national government and rein in the centrifugal impulses of the 
states. But that hardly means that Marshall stood ready to aban-
don all constitutional constraints on nat ional power, and one can 
readily imagine that he would be shocked at the extent of national 
authority today. It is no coincidence that Rubin and Feeley, u p o n 
whom Barber seems to pa t tern his position, bill their managerial 
concept of decentralization as a m o d e r n remedy for an outda ted 
"neurosis." Certainly there is no th ing traditional, let a lone Mar-
shallian, abou t it. 
Cooperative (and Uncooperat ive) Federalism 
Cooperative federalism eschews the separate spheres of dual feder-
alism and embraces the reality that, in m o d e r n America, "virtually 
all governments are involved in virtually all functions. . . . [T] here 
is hardly any activity that does no t involve the federal, state, and 
some local government in impor tan t responsibilities."52 Philip 
Weiser has explained: 
In contrast to a dual federalism, cooperative federalism envisions 
a sharing of regulatory authority between the federal government 
and the states that allows states to regulate within a framework delin-
eated by federal law. In particular, modern regulatory programs put 
in place across a variety of fields ranging from nearly all environ-
mental programs to telecommunications regulation to health care 
. . . all embrace a unified federal structure that includes a role for 
state implementation.53 
U n d e r cooperative federalism, then, national authorit ies do no t 
merely possess concur ren t regulatoryjurisdiction; the actual activ-
ity of each government is closely integrated with that of the other.54 
Advocates of constitutional limitations on national authority 
have often regarded cooperative federalism with suspicion, see-
ing the subordinate role of state officials within federal regulatory 
schemes as reflecting a "concentrat ion of political powers in the 
national government."5 5 Larry Kramer has po in ted out, however, 
that in a cooperative system, " [t] he federal government needs the 
states as m u c h as the reverse, and this mutua l dependency guaran-
tees state officials a voice in the process."56 H e concedes that this 
is " [n ]o t necessarily an equal voice: because federal law is supreme 
and Congress holds the purse strings, the federal government is 
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bound to prevail if push comes to shove. But federal dependency 
on state administrators gives federal officials an incentive to see 
that push doesn't come to shove, or at least that this happens 
as seldom as possible, and that means taking state interests into 
account."57 More recently, Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Ger-
ken have taken this insight and run with it to develop a model 
of "uncooperative federalism," which "occurs when states carry-
ing out the Patriot Act refuse to enforce the portions they deem 
unconstitutional, when states implementing federal environmen-
tal law use that power to push federal authorities to take a new 
position, or when states relying on federal funds create welfare 
programs that erode the foundations of the very policies they are 
being asked to carry out."58 This phenomenon, they note, occurs 
"in such varied arenas as immigration, healthcare, and education. 
In each of these fields, states use regulatory power conferred by 
the federal government to tweak, challenge, and even dissent from 
federal law."59 
One may think of "uncooperative federalism" as a particular 
form of Morton Grodzins's general idea of "decentralization by 
mild chaos."60 Despite the absence of clear lines demarcating state 
and national power, the reality of multiple power centers and 
the myriad opportunities to exert influence guarantee meaning-
ful checks on central authority. Thus described, however, unco-
operative federalism seems like a practical consequence of par-
ticular institutional forms of managerial decentralization, rather 
than an alternative model of dual sovereignty. Nonetheless, at 
least some approaches to cooperative federalism retain a place 
for sovereignty. 
In particular, the anticommandeering doctrine imposes an im-
portant constitutional constraint on Congress's ability to enlist 
the states as implementers of federal law. That doctrine holds that 
Congress may not require the legislative and executive institu-
tions of state government to enact legislation pursuant to federal 
directives, enforce the requirements of federal law, or otherwise 
serve as the instruments—as opposed to the objects—of federal 
regulation.61 Because Congress may not simply command such 
implementation, it must secure the states' consent by making par-
ticipation in the federal scheme attractive. Likewise, constitutional 
constraints on Congress's authority to condition grants of federal 
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monies on state acquiescence in federal mandates52 ensure that 
states retain some enforceable rights against the national govern-
ment even in cooperative federalism schemes. The presence of 
these constraints ensures that some aspects of the federal structure 
remain constitutionally entrenched, even within a cooperative fed-
eralism scheme. 
Subsidiarity or Collective Action Federalism 
A second model of dual sovereignty reasons from the underlying 
values that a federal system is meant to serve. Donald Regan has 
argued, for example, that "in thinking about whether the federal 
government has the power to do something or other, we should 
ask what special reason there is for the federal government to have 
that power. What reason is there to think the states are incapable 
or untrustworthy?"63 Professor Regan's approach bears a strong 
family resemblance to the European Union's principle of "subsid-
iarity," under which "the Community shall take action . . . only if 
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suf-
ficiently achieved by the Member States and therefore by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by 
the Community."64 The Member States of the EU added subsid-
iarity to the EU's governing treaties as a result of fears that the 
original documents—which like the American Constitution relied 
on specific enumerations of the EU's powers—were insufficiently 
protective of Member State prerogatives.65 
In this country, the most extended and thoughtful attempt to 
realize a subsidiarity-type approach to federalism is the recent work 
of Robert Cooter and my colleague Neil Siegel. Professors Cooter 
and Siegel read the Constitution's power grants to Congress in 
Article I, Section 8 as embodying a single coherent principle of 
"collective action federalism."66 In their view, "the clauses of Sec-
tion 8 . . . authorizfe] Congress to tax, spend, and regulate when 
two or more states face collective action problems. Conversely, gov-
ernmental activities that do not pose collective action problems 
for the states are 'internal to a state' or 'local.' "67 Congress would 
therefore be able to legislate to solve a collective action problem 
whether or not the legislation regulated commercial activity; on 
the other hand, even regulation of buying and selling might fall 
outside Congress's power if it did not respond to some difficulty 
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preventing resolution of the problem through action by individ-
ual states. 
The principal difficulty with subsidiarity-based approaches is 
that they tend to collapse the constitutional question ("What does 
the Constitution permit?") into the policy question ("What would 
it be desirable for Congress to do?"). As numerous commenta-
tors have noted, this makes subsidiarity inquiries particularly dif-
ficult for courts, which ordinarily depend for their legitimacy on 
the supposition that they simply enforce the law without second-
guessing Congress's policy judgments—that they exercise "judg-
ment," not "will," in Alexander Hamilton's memorable account.68 
This difficulty has bedeviled efforts to enforce subsidiarity as a con-
stitutional principle in the European Union,69 and commentators 
(including this one) have raised similar concerns with efforts to 
develop a similar approach on this side of the pond.70 
One may also worry that this logic, taken too far, would leave 
precious little to the States. As Morton Grodzins pointed out long 
ago, "[IJnequities of state resources, disparities in educational 
facilities and results, the gap between actual and potential educa-
tional services, and, above all, the adverse national consequences 
that might follow long-term inadequacies of state-local control 
would almost certainly, if the choice had to be made, establish 
education as the exclusive concern of the national government."71 
One suspects that similar arguments could be made in almost 
any field if one's conception of a collective action problem is suf-
ficiently broad. And to the extent that courts defer to legislative 
judgments in order to avoid crossing the line into policy making, 
they will be leaving the foxes in charge of the henhouse.72 
The important point for present purposes, however, is that sub-
sidiarity or collective action federalism represents a distinct model 
of dual sovereignty from dual federalism. It retains an aspect of 
sovereignty because, according to the model's proponents, the 
notion that some collective action problem must exist to justify 
national action is an interpretation of Article I, Section 8—that 
is, it is an entrenched part of the Constitution. National action 
without such a justification would thus be unconstitutional. And 
yet collective action problems—or their absence—may occur in 
virtually any area of regulatory concern. This approach thus does 
not yield the separate and exclusive spheres of regulatory activity 
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that characterized dual federalism.73 Some aspects of criminal law, 
or environmental law, or any other field will raise collective action 
problems, while others may not. The justification for any given 
national endeavor must be judged on its own merits, regardless of 
the field in which it occurs. 
Process Federalism 
Process federalism has its unlikely origins in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority1*—a case that William Van Alstyne 
decried as the "second death of federalism."75 Justice Blackmun's 
majority opinion in Garcia asserted that "the fundamental limita-
tion that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce 
Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather than 
one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Com-
merce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural 
nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compen-
sate for possible failings in the national political process rather 
than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy.'"76 Process 
federalism thus eschews the exclusive subject matter spheres of 
state and national authority that characterize dual federalism. 
Instead, it relies on the political and institutional structure of the 
national government itself to preserve the autonomy of the states. 
As Professor Van Alstyne's memorable phrase suggests, Garcia 
was initially either lamented or hailed as the end of the line for 
state sovereignty.77 Both friends and foes of constitutional limita-
tions on national authority assumed that the abandonment of sub-
stantive limits really connoted an abandonment of any limits at all. 
This turned out not to be true, however. Just as John Hart Ely has 
shown that a process-based theory of individual rights can provide 
a powerful basis for judicial review,78 so too process federalism has 
turned out to provide vigorous protection for state autonomy.79 In 
both instances, process theory simply shifts the focus from the sub-
stantive character of governmental action to the institutional pro-
cess by which the government acts. 
Professor Ely's idea was that our system of government ordinar-
ily safeguards individual liberties through the political process of 
democratic representation; courts play a supporting role, stepping 
in whenever there is reason to believe that the ordinary demo-
cratic process has become skewed (e.g., through restrictions on 
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political participation) or particular groups have been systemati-
cally excluded (e.g., racial minorities).80 Process federalism simi-
larly builds on Herbert Wechsler's insight (derived in turn from 
James Madison and John Marshall) that the first-line protection 
for federalism in our governmental system is the political repre-
sentation of the states in Congress.81 Building on Wechsler, other 
scholars have stressed the role of political parties as well as more 
particular institutional features, such as the role of state legisla-
tures in redistricting for federal congressional districts.82 
Other process federalists have emphasized the procedural protec-
tions that states derive from the many impediments to federal law-
making. As Brad Clark has explained, "The lawmaking procedures 
prescribed by the Constitution safeguard federalism in an impor-
tant respect simply by requiring the participation and assent of 
multiple actors. These procedures make federal law more difficult 
to adopt by creating a series of 'veto gates.' . . . [T]he imposition of 
cumbersome federal lawmaking procedures suggests that the Con-
stitution reserves substantive lawmaking power to the states and 
the people both by limiting the powers assigned to the federal gov-
ernment and by rendering that government frequently incapable 
of exercising them."83 
Supreme Court doctrine has reinforced these political and pro-
cedural safeguards of federalism in a variety of ways. Most im-
portant, the Court has constructed an array of "clear statement" 
rules of statutory construction, triggered whenever Congress acts 
in a way that implicates the prerogatives and/or autonomy of the 
states. These rules require a clear expression of Congress's intent 
before a federal statute may be construed to regulate the public 
functions of state governments,84 impose financial liability on the 
states,85 abrogate state sovereign immunity,86 impose conditions 
on the grant of federal funds to state governments,87 or preempt 
state law.88 While these canons of statutory construction are not 
uncontroversial,89 they are best understood as an extension of the 
underlying federalist constitutional principles.90 They enhance the 
political safeguards of federalism by requiring proponents of fed-
eral laws affecting the states to put the states' defenders in Con-
gress on notice; they enhance the procedural safeguards by add-
ing an additional drafting hurdle that legislation implicating state 
autonomy must surmount. As a practical matter, it is fair to say that 
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the Court's clear statement cases have preserved a great deal more 
state autonomy than its largely symbolic efforts to police the sub-
stantive boundaries of the Commerce Clause. 
Similarly, one can best understand the anticommandeering 
doctrine of New York and Printzm as a tool of process federalism. 
Federal commandeering—that is, the power of Congress to re-
quire state institutions to implement federal law—-allows national 
authorities to foist many of the costs of national action onto state 
institutions. These include financial costs, because states must bear 
the costs of implementation without any requirement that Con-
gress reimburse them, and political costs, because state officials 
often become the public face of unpopular federal programs (like 
nuclear waste disposal in New York and limits on gun purchases in 
Printz).92 The anticommandeering doctrine does not, in practice, 
prevent the states from implementing federal law; as I have already 
said, cooperative federalism arrangements are pervasive in our sys-
tem. But because the doctrine requires Congress to solicit rather 
than command state implementation, the states can insist on com-
pensation for their expenses and refuse to participate in the most 
unpopular programs.93 This measure of independence from out-
right federal control may also enhance the ability of state adminis-
trators within cooperative federalism regimes to use the administra-
tive process to influence and/or resist federal policy. 
Professor Barber makes some very odd assertions about process 
federalism; for instance, he claims that the process federalist "will 
eventually claim that the only good anyone can really know is plea-
sure centered on the individual human body."941 suspect this con-
clusion would come as a major surprise to scholars (like this one) 
who have long advocated process federalism. As I have already sug-
gested, it may be more constructive to engage the arguments that 
process federalists actually make—Barber's essay is devoid of cita-
tion to any work that actually discusses process federalism—than 
to theorize about what arguments process federalists must make. 
In any event, what actually distinguishes process-based from dual 
federalism models is simply the former's focus on the political and 
procedural dynamics by which the states participate in the national 
political process and federal actors construct supreme federal law. 
Get those dynamics right, the process federalist contends, and 
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one need not worry about whether particular national initiatives 
intrude into some protected state sphere of authority. 
Immunity Federalism 
A final model is rarely discussed distinctively in the literature but 
is quite prominent in the Court's case law. That model is "immu-
nity federalism," which seeks to protect the institutions of state 
government themselves from being subjected to or held account-
able for violations of national law.95 Dual federalism emphasized 
affirmative authority to regulate—that is, to prescribe legal rules 
governing the conduct of nongovernmental actors. It was thus 
concerned, for example, with whether national or state authori-
ties get to control the legal regime governing public education or 
immigration. Immunity federalism, by contrast, is relatively uncon-
cerned with affirmative regulatory jurisdiction; it sets no limits on 
the scope of national regulatory authority over private individu-
als. This model concerns national regulation solely as it impacts 
the institutions of state governments themselves. A good example 
is thus National League of Cities v. Usery96 which did not challenge 
Congress's authority to regulate the wages and hours of all pri-
vately employed workers in the United States but did restrict its 
right to apply those regulations to state governmental employees. 
The most obvious flowering of immunity federalism has, of 
course, occurred in the Supreme Court's cases construing the sov-
ereign immunity of states from lawsuits by private individuals and 
corporations. More than a century ago, in Hans v. Louisiana,97 the 
Court construed the scope of this immunity to extend significantly 
beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment, which had generally 
been considered the source of state sovereign immunity.98 Much 
more recendy, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida99 the Court held that Con-
gress may not subject states to suit when they violate federal law 
by enacting statutes that "abrogate" the states' immunity, at least 
when Congress acts pursuant to its Article I powers. Subsequent 
decisions have extended this principle to suits in state courts and 
before federal administrative agencies, notwithstanding the limita-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment's text to "the judicial power of 
the United States,"100 and an impressive line of cases has narrowly 
construed Congress's exceptional power to abrogate state sover-
eign immunity when it acts pursuant to its power to enforce the 
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Reconstruction Amendments.101 The important point about all 
of this is that state sovereign immunity does not protect a single 
square inch of state regulatory "turf from federal intrusion; it sim-
ply exempts the states from (one means of) accountability when 
they themselves violate federal law.102 
A final, less frequently remarked instance of immunity federal-
ism appears in the Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence. Although 
habeas has recently played a prominent role in the national War 
on Terror as a remedy for detention by national executive authori-
ties, by far its most common use is as a vehicle for collateral review 
of state criminal convictions for compliance with the procedural 
requirements of federal constitutional law.103 Habeas corpus is 
thus another mechanism for holding states accountable when they 
violate federal law, and the extensive jurisprudence of the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts limiting the scope of federal ha-
beas review is thus another instance of immunity federalism.104 (In 
this, it is worth noting, the Court has been encouraged and even 
surpassed by Congress itself, which passed extensive restrictions on 
habeas as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act in 1996.)105 Importantly, the number of state sovereign immu-
nity and habeas corpus decisions by the Supreme Court over the 
course of the "federalist revival" dwarfs the number of cases con-
sidering substantive limitations on Congress's powers. 
The point of this survey of the multifarious models of contem-
porary federalism doctrine is to show that dual federalism and 
managerial decentralization are not the only choices for allocating 
authority between the national government and the states, and that 
dual sovereignty may be maintained in other ways than by defin-
ing separate and exclusive spheres of state and national author-
ity. These models, like any analytical construct imposed upon an 
unruly and variegated set of real-world decisions and structures, 
are vague around the edges, often overlap, and indeed may not 
be mutually exclusive; process federalism, for example, can be a 
valuable tool to preserve some measure of state sovereignty in an 
institutional structure of cooperative federalism. The important 
point is that there is a tendency to assume that any rule of law that 
accords some measure of sovereignty to state governments is an 
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instance of "dual federalism," but we should resist that tendency. It 
is of course a prerogative of scholars to define terms any way that 
we want, but we lose valuable analytical distinctions when we lump 
together approaches that are in fact quite different. 
2. T H E CURRENT STATE OF PLAY 
Having sketched out the dual federalist model and its competi-
tors, we are in a position to evaluate which of these models best re-
flects the current state of affairs in intergovernmental practice and 
constitutional doctrine. My principal contention is that, although 
scholars and sometimes dissenting judges often worry that the 
Supreme Court is about to revive dual federalism, it has not in fact 
done so and is extremely unlikely to do so in the future. Current 
doctrine and practice instead reflect a blend of managerial decen-
tralization, cooperative federalism, and process federalism. 
The Court's restraint, however, has sometimes been unidirec-
tional—that is, it has generally rejected dual federalism in its cases 
limiting national power, but has often embraced it in its cases lim-
iting state power. These cases tend to define an exclusive sphere 
of federal authority—most often involving foreign affairs or immi-
gration, but sometimes more prosaic fields like banking—and 
presumptively exclude state regulatory activity touching on those 
fields. Neither the results nor the reasoning is categorical, and the 
Court has actually left far more room for state activity within these 
presumptively federal spheres than it might have in the heyday of 
dual federalism. Nonetheless, these cases represent a troubling 
movement back in the direction of the old unworkable doctrine. 
Dual Federalism Is Dead 
Dual federalism dominated constitutional law for roughly a cen-
tury and a half. Beginning in cases like Gibbons, the Court sought 
to define separate and exclusive spheres of state and federal au-
thority. Because Congress was not eager to exercise its affirmative 
regulatory powers for most of the nineteenth century, most of 
the cases involved challenges to state regulation under either the 
dormant Commerce Clause or the judge-made "general common 
law"—both of which effectively forbade state intrusion into the 
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"national" sphere of interstate commerce.105 As federal regulatory 
efforts increased around the turn of the twentieth century, the 
courts began to employ dual federalism to restrict those efforts, 
either by construing federal statutes narrowly to avoid intruding 
on state spheres of authority107 or simply by striking them down.108 
The Court upheld as many statutes as it struck down, however, 
even during the infamous Lochner era. It was thus forced to draw 
increasingly fine distinctions between goods that were in the 
"stream of commerce" and those that were not, or between "direct" 
and "indirect" effects on the interstate market.109 The advent of 
the New Deal put increasing pressure on these distinctions, and 
the Court's eventual capitulation to the national regulatory state 
in 1937 ultimately swept them away. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp.,11" the Court signaled that it would no longer distinguish 
between phases of the production cycle—that is, between regula-
tion of "manufacturing" or "employment," which had heretofore 
been a state sphere, and the actual buying, selling, or transport 
of goods. And in Wickard v. Filburn,ul decided five years later, a 
unanimous court held that Congress may regulate even individual 
activities with a minimal impact on commerce, so long as in the 
aggregate that class of activity would have a substantial effect on 
the interstate market. By 1950, Edward Corwin could say that the 
"entire system of constitutional interpretation" embodied in dual 
federalism lay "in ruins."112 
The question, of course, is whether the "federalist revival" of 
the Rehnquist Court (and possibly the Roberts Court) has revived 
dual federalism. Professor Barber and a surprising number of 
other critics seem to think that it has.113 Barber fears a "recrudes-
cence of state sovereignty" under which "the states' rights bloc on 
the Rehnquist Court [has] affirmed the contract theory [under 
which the states are "separate and independent sovereigns who 
could nullify unconstitutional national acts and even withdraw 
from the union"] and voided numerous national acts in the name 
of 'state sovereignty.'"114 There are, however, very few citations. 
The only case from this period that Barber actually mentions by 
name is U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,115 which he takes to rep-
resent "an endorsement of the contract theory by four members of 
the Rehnquist Court."116 One can quibble about whether even that 
is really true—Term Limits grappled with the Framers' theory of 
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representation in order to construe whether the Constitution's Qual-
ifications Clauses for members of Congress were exclusive, not the 
limits of Congress's regulatory powers, and invoking the contract 
theory for the former purpose is quite different from using it to 
determine the latter.1" But putting that aside, Justice Thomas's 
opinion in Term Limits was a dissent. It struck down nothing and has 
not been an important source of guidance for any of the decisions 
in which the Court has struck down federal statutes. Moreover, 
even Justice Thomas has made clear that he has a sophisticated 
theory of the Supremacy Clause (which was not at issue in Term 
Limits) that allows broad scope for federal authority.118 
The best cases for a dual federalist revival would be United States 
v. Lopez,119 in which the Court struck down the federal Gun Free 
School Zones Act as exceeding Congress's authority under the 
Commerce Clause, and United States v. Morrison,120 in which the 
Court similarly invalidated the private civil suit provision of the fed-
eral Violence Against Women Act. Lopez was certainly exciting, in 
the sense that it was the first time that the Court had struck down 
a federal statute under the Commerce Clause since the New Deal 
revolution, and many of us took Morrison as confirming that Lopez 
was not a sport and the Court was, in fact, serious about limiting na-
tional power. Neither of these cases, however, amounted to a return 
to the traditional doctrine of dual federalism. As I have discussed in 
more detail elsewhere,121 both cases turned on whether Congress 
was regulating an act that was "commercial" in nature. The Lopez 
Court explicitly reaffirmed Wickard v. Filburn122 and the rest of its 
post-New Deal jurisprudence,123 and it denned "commercial" ac-
tivity so broadly that there are no substantive fields of regulatory 
concern in which many, if not most, activities will not be subject to 
federal regulation.124 Equally important, both Lopez and Morrison 
made clear that the Court had abandoned the distinction—initially 
drawn by John Marshall in Gibbons—between commerce "among 
the several states" and "the exclusively internal commerce of a 
State."125 The Rehnquist Court, in other words, was significantly less 
committed to dual federalism than is "Marshallian federalism." 
In any event, the excitement over Lopez and Morrison was short-
lived. Five years after Morrison, in Gonzales v. Raich,126 the Court 
affirmed Congress's power to regulate the medicinal use of home-
grown marijuana, notwithstanding the fact that the marijuana in 
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question had been neither purchased nor transported across a 
state line. And the Court considered it legally irrelevant that Cali-
fornia had enacted a regulatory scheme licensing and regulating 
the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes.127 Justice Kennedy 
joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion, signaling that he was 
unwilling to find that any significant federal regulatory program 
lacked the requisite link to commercial activity. And, perhaps most 
damaging of all to any hopes of a return to dual federalism, Justice 
Scalia wrote a concurrence embracing a broad view of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, which would allow Congress' to regulate 
even noncommercial activity so long as it bears some relation to a 
commercial activity that Congress can reach.128 
The Court's recent decision on the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) complicates the picture somewhat, 
but none of the justices endorsed a return to dual federalism. In 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),129 a ma-
jority of the Court upheld the act's "individual mandate" that all 
persons must buy health insurance under the taxing power,130 but a 
different majority opined that the mandate did exceed the limits of 
Congress's commerce power.131 That portion of the opinion—the 
most relevant for our purposes—did not suggest that health care 
is somehow an exclusively state sphere of regulation. Rather, the 
Chief Justice and the four dissenters agreed that the Commerce 
Clause does not permit Congress to regulate pure inactivity—that 
is, the decision not to buy health insurance.132 This is an impor-
tant holding, both because the PPACA is an important statute and 
because it reverses the post-Raich impression that the Court might 
be ready to abandon Lopez and Morrison. But there are not many 
such mandates in federal law, and the Court's holding at most 
places a particular regulatory tool off limits rather than isolating 
a substantive field of regulation as beyond federal competence.133 
Finally, when Professor Barber refers to "numerous national 
acts" that the Rehnquist Court has "voided . . . in the name of 'state 
sovereignty,' "1M he can only be referring to the Court's admittedly 
impressive string of holdings under the Eleventh Amendment 
doctrine of state sovereign immunity. I agree that these cases are 
wrongly decided and that they represent an unhelpful focus on 
state sovereignty rather than state regulatory autonomy.135 But they 
hardly represent a return to dual federalism.136 First, these cases 
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simply invalidate provisions of the relevant federal acts that sub-
ject the states to suits by private individuals for money damages; 
they do not invalidate the underlying substantive requirements 
of the relevant acts, which continue to bind even the states. It is 
thus impossible to say that these decisions carve out any exclusive 
sphere of state authority; they simply restrict the remedies avail-
able when states violate the law. Second, these remedial restric-
tions are radically incomplete: they do not bar suits against state 
officers for prospective relief or for damages when the officers are 
sued in their individual capacity. Nor do they bar even suits against 
the state itself for damages when the United States is the plain-
tiff or when Congress, through its power of the purse, induces the 
states to waive their immunity. All these "workarounds" signifi-
cantly minimize the practical significance of state sovereign immu-
nity.137 Finally, the Court seems to be in substantial retreat from 
these holdings, having upheld congressional provisions abrogat-
ing state sovereign immunity in several recent decisions.138 
Sixty years later, Professor Corwin is still right: dual federal-
ism lies "in ruins." What we have instead is a complicated and not 
always coherent set of doctrines emphasizing process federalism 
(particularly in the Court's "clear statement" rules of statutory 
construction),139 an important but narrow rule against "comman-
deering" state institutions operating within cooperative federalism 
regimes, and (perhaps) even narrower rules prohibiting use of the 
commerce power to reach pockets of activity that either have no 
relation to commerce (Lopez and Morrison) or do not even amount 
to activity at all (NFIB). The Necessary and Proper Clause, more-
over, looms as a congenial catchall power in doubtful cases.140 
There are interesting debates to be had concerning whether the 
Court's current doctrines—both permissive and restrictive—are 
legitimate, whether they go far enough, and even whether the 
courts are well suited to balance national and state authority. But it 
will help, in approaching any of these questions, to appreciate how 
much the ground has shifted since 1937. 
Long Live Dual Federalism ? 
Both the Court and the commentators have done their best to 
inter dual federalism, and for the most part they have succeeded. 
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But in some areas, dual federalism dies hard. To paraphrase Jus-
tice Scalia's famous description of the Lemon test in the Court's 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: "Like some ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles 
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, [dual federal-
ism] stalks our [federalism] jurisprudence once again."141 Only this 
time, it is frightening the proponents of state regulatory activity in 
fields where the national government has traditionally played a 
significant role. The tendency to revive dual federalist notions of 
exclusive national power has been most pronounced in the area 
of foreign relations law, including recent controversies of state 
efforts to ratchet up the enforcement of federal laws regulating 
undocumented aliens. But a similar, if more low-profile, trend has 
surfaced in the Court's statutory preemption cases. The Court 
would do better to bring each area into line with its more gen-
eral federalism doctrine by giving these dual federalist tendencies 
a speedy quietus. 
I wrote in 2001 that the Court seemed to be clinging to a dual 
federalist view in some of its foreign affairs cases by applying a 
more vigorous rule of preemption.142 In Crosby v. National Foreign 
Trade Council,™ for example, the Court struck down a Massachu-
setts law limiting state dealings with companies doing business in 
Burma, notwithstanding the absence' of any explicit federal stat-
utory language preempting such state laws. More recently, the 
Court seemed to extend Crosby in American Insurance Association v. 
Garamendi,144 which struck down a California law requiring insur-
ance companies to disclose any connection they might have to 
Holocaust insurance policies, again in the absence of explicit pre-
emptive language. Both decisions strongly suggested that the states 
simply had no place regulating the business of foreign relations. 
Likewise, in the last year, much of the debate concerning state 
governmental initiatives to regulate illegal immigration has taken 
a decidedly dual federalist turn. In particular, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's ruling striking down Arizona's restrictive immigration law 
strongly suggested that states are simply incapable of regulating 
immigration—this is an exclusively federal field.149 On review 
in Arizona v. United States, however, the Supreme Court took a 
more equivocal position. On the one hand, it suggested that im-
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migration must be a federal sphere by emphasizing that "foreign 
countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of their 
nationals in the United States must be able to confer and com-
municate on this subject with one national sovereign, not the 
50 separate States."146 On the other, Justice Kennedy's majority 
opinion also acknowledged that the states have a role to play in 
this field, noting that "[t]he pervasiveness of federal regulation 
does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the 
States."147 The Court's actual analysis stressed ordinary preemption 
principles, not doctrines of federal exclusivity,148 although it does 
seem fair to say that the Court applied those doctrines with a pro-
preemption thumb on the scale. 
Similar echoes of dual federalism can be found in the Court's 
other preemption cases, where the Court often emphasizes tradi-
tional fields of state or federal regulatory authority. Rick Hills has 
asserted that "the Roberts Court's [preemption] decisions seem to 
follow a traditional script of dual federalism—that is, carving out 
separate spheres for state and federal governments and enforcing 
norms of mutual non-interference between these spheres."149 A 
good example is United States v. Locke,150 in which the Court held 
that federal law preempted Washington state regulations govern-
ing oil tanker safety in Puget Sound that went further than federal 
requirements. The Court emphasized that maritime safety, which 
implicated international obligations as well as domestic law, was a 
traditionally federal field and thus refused to apply any presump-
tion against a preemptive reading of the statute. Locke illustrates 
not only the backward glance to dual federalism but also the trou-
ble inherent in that glance; after all, it is equally easy to character-
ize Locke as a case about safeguarding the natural resources of the 
state—a traditional state sphere.151 
In any event, efforts to revive dual federalism even in these 
limited nationalist enclaves blink reality. As Grodzins has pointed 
out, "[fjoreign affairs, national defense, and the development of 
atomic energy are usually considered to be exclusive responsibili-
ties of the national government. In fact, the state and local gov-
ernments have extensive responsibilities, directly and indirectly, in 
each of these fields."152 This has only become more true in the dec-
ades since Grodzins wrote.153 In our increasingly globalized world, 
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no governmental actor—including states and even localities—can 
avoid interacting with the rest of the world in a way that implicates 
national foreign policy.154 
This nationalist version of dual federalism should not be over-
stated, however. All the cases I have mentioned are statutory con-
struction cases, not efforts to draw hard constitutional lines in the 
sand, and cases like Arizona seem to leave significant room for state 
regulation even in areas of federal primacy. Moreover, there are 
plentiful counterexamples. Just this past term, for instance, the 
Court upheld a different Arizona law providing for penalties on 
employers who employ undocumented aliens.155 The Court not 
only found the law not preempted; it also went out of its way to say 
that the law did not implicate any unique field of federal authority. 
We are far from a revival of dual federalism, but some of the cases 
in these areas are worrisome nonetheless. 
3. Is DUAL FEDERALISM "SELF-DEFEATING"? 
This final section considers two distinct critiques of dual federal-
ism. The first is Professor Barber's, which holds that dual federal-
ism is necessarily incoherent because public goods like liberty and 
democracy must be defined by national actors in a national forum, 
leaving no room for more particularistic arguments from "states' 
rights." The second is more in the vein of conventional wisdom, 
which believes dual federalism became extinct because it was not 
susceptible to principled application over time. 
Professor Barber's Argument 
The central claim of Professor Barber's essay is that dual federal-
ism—by which, as I have said, he seems to mean dual sovereignty— 
is logically self-defeating. "Should there be a dual federalist as well 
as a national reading of. . . any . . . matter material to the federal-
ism debate, including the nature of the Constitution as a whole—if 
there is an interpretive choice of any description, dual federalism 
will (or should) lose the debate."156 This proposition extends not 
only to "the Supremacy Clause," but also to "the Tenth Amend-
ment, or the enumeration of powers, or the breadth of national 
powers, or the Framers' intentions, or the formation of the Union, 
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or the nature of liberty."157 Every aspect of our constitutional law, 
in other words, is to be construed in a nationalist way. 
In assessing the scope of this proposition, much would seem to 
depend on how often we think "there is an interpretive choice of 
any description." On some issues there may not be. John Marshall 
wrote in Gibbons, for example, that "[t]he enumeration [of fed-
eral powers] presupposes something not enumerated,"158 which 
seems to mean that the very notion that the national government 
must operate within finite bounds is not really open to question. 
But that is arguably enough to decide a case like United States v. 
Lopez;'59 the critical moment in that case occurred when Justice 
O'Connor asked Solicitor General Drew Days whether, if the 
Gun Free School Zones Act were constitutional, he could think 
of anything Congress might do that would be outside its power.160 
He could not, and that was that; the Court was simply unwilling 
to transgress Marshall's principle that something must lie outside 
Congress's enumerated powers.161 Although some very smart jus-
tices dissented in Lopez, I would be tempted to classify it as a case 
in which there was not "an interpretive choice of any description." 
I doubt, however, that Professor Barber would agree. Barber 
sums up his argument this way: 
The states' rights debate is a national debate, conducted in a na-
tional forum. An admittedly local good can't count as a reason in 
that forum. The dual federalist who submits to the forum loses the 
debate before it begins because the good that would justify dual fed-
eralism would be a nationally recognized good applied by a national 
agency as a restraint on the states.162 
It's hard to know what to make of this argument. As an empiri-
cal description of the actual debates that take place in national fo-
rums, it's simply incorrect. Consider, for example, a typical appro-
priations debate in Congress. A congressman may well argue for 
a benefit to his local district—say, a "bridge to nowhere" or a re-
search grant to a local university. To say that people cannot make 
arguments based on local goods in a national forum is to ignore 
what goes on in the halls of national government every day. Profes-
sor Barber's claim would also render incomprehensible Wechsler's 
influential argument that the primary protection for state auton-
omy and prerogatives comes from the states' ability to argue for 
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those things in a national forum—the Congress—through their 
elected representatives.163 If a national forum can consider only 
"national goods"—whatever those are—then how are the "politi-
cal safeguards of federalism" to operate? 
Professor Barber's argument is also flatly inconsistent with the 
role of national courts in enforcing the boundaries of state and 
national authority in federal systems. Commentators often empha-
size that arguments for limiting national power vis-a-vis the sub-
national units can and should be presented in a national forum—a 
proposition that Barber argues is simply impossible. The European 
jurist Koen Lenaerts, for instance, has stated that " [federalism is 
present whenever a divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national 
or supranational constitution and umpired by the supreme court 
of the common legal order."164 And, in fact, the constitutional 
courts of many federal systems hear, with some regularity, the sorts 
of claims that national power must be limited.165 Alphonso Lopez's 
(victorious) lawyer would no doubt be surprised to hear that it is 
impossible to make arguments for limiting national power vis-a-vis 
the states in a national forum like the Supreme Court. 
But perhaps Professor Barber means this to be a normative argu-
ment: the only reasons that should count in a national forum are 
national reasons. It's not clear why this should be true; the argu-
ment that states' rights claims must fail because only national rea-
sons should count seems to assume the very point in issue. But 
even if we grant the premise, it is hardly clear that Barber's conclu-
sion follows. On his view, the appropriation-seeking congressman 
must explain why a federal expenditure in his district benefits the 
nation as a whole. But can he not point out that few federal pro-
grams benefit all Americans at once, or evenly, and that by benefit-
ing some (his constituents) we benefit the larger whole?166 That 
is certainly the premise behind federal disaster relief funds, for 
example. The broader point is that it may not always be easy to 
distinguish between national and local goods. 
The critical case of this ambiguity is the value of state sover-
eignty in checking national power. As Madison suggested in The 
Federalist No. 51, federalism is a central ingredient in our system of 
checks and balances, part of the "double security" for individual 
liberty at the heart of the Constitution.167 If that is right, then why 
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isn't state sovereignty itself a national good? If it is, then it seems to 
me that Professor Barber's argument collapses in on itself.168 
Professor Barber seems to deny that checks and balances can 
itself be a national good when he says that "Marshall's was a positive 
constitutionalism; dual federalism belongs to a tradition of nega-
tive constitutionalism. Marshall's positive constitutionalism makes 
more sense than negative constitutionalism because establishing 
a government to pursue good things makes sense while establish-
ing a government mainly to prevent government from doing bad 
things makes no sense."169 This is a highly contestable assertion, of 
course.170 Much of constitutional law is concerned with preventing 
government from doing bad things.171 The original Constitution 
was obsessed with dividing and checking governmental power,172 
and Barber's dismissal of "negative constitutionalism" (it "makes 
no sense") condemns not only federalism but also separation of 
powers and individual rights. It would condemn Marshall's own 
jurisprudence, which struck down governmental action when it 
transgressed constitutional limitations.173 Moreover, limiting the 
power of the national government is not simply a "negative" enter-
prise. Much of the point is to preserve the autonomy of state gov-
ernments to pursue their own "positive" programs—for example, 
permitting gay marriage and medicinal marijuana, or protect-
ing the environment more rigorously than federal law—without 
national interference.174 
In any event, Professor Barber's claim that proponents of state 
sovereignty simply can't argue for that value in a national forum 
like Congress or the Supreme Court175 reminds me of Mark 
Twain's reply when asked if he believed in infant baptism: "Of 
course I do," he said. "I've seen it done." People who believe in 
state sovereignty do make these arguments in national forums, and 
they are unlikely to stop simply because someone tells them that 
it's impossible. It is far better, in my view, to engage the arguments 
that people actually do make on their merits. 
Determinate Line Drawing and the Frankfurter Constraint 
All that said, I agree with Professor Barber that dual federalism— 
defined considerably more narrowly than he suggests—is a failed 
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approach; I simply disagree about the reason for that failure. Our 
disagreement has practical consequences. For one thing, our con-
trasting accounts of the reason dual federalism must fail point in 
different directions for the use of dual federalist doctrines to limit 
state authority. If the problem with dual federalism is that we need 
a single nationalist vision of liberty and democracy, then we have 
every reason to defend exclusive zones of national authority, like 
foreign affairs or immigration, from intrusions by the states.176 
But if, as I argue in this section, the real trouble is that exclusive 
spheres of authority simply cannot be defined and maintained in 
a principled way, then that difficulty will plague dual federalism 
whether it is used to restrict state or national power. 
Dual federalism was primarily a model of judicial review, and as 
such it had to be amenable to the institutional constraints faced by 
courts. As I have argued at greater length elsewhere,1'7 the primary 
constraint on courts is that they must make decisions according 
to law; to invoke Hamilton again, they must exercise "judgment," 
not "will."178 Or, as Wechsler put it, judicial decision making must 
be "principled" in a way that legislative decision making need not 
be.179 Most assessments of dual federalism have agreed that dual 
federalism failed because, especially as the national economy be-
came more integrated and the public came to expect more from 
government, the separate spheres model became incapable of 
principled application. As Vicki Jackson has observed, "[W]ithout 
written guideposts on the content of the enclaves in the face of 
changing economies and functions of government, the substantive 
enclave theory is unworkable."180 
In the 1930s, Felix Frankfurter published an analysis of the 
Supreme Court's nineteenth-century decisions construing the 
boundaries of dual federalism under the Commerce Clause that 
emphasized the Court's need and desire to avoid the appearance 
of "judicial policy-making."181 Larry Lessig calls this the "Frank-
furter Constraint," and he contends that it is fundamental to judi-
cial legitimacy.182 "[A] rule is an inferior rule," he writes, "if, in its 
application, it appears to be political, in the sense of appearing 
to allow extra-legal factors to control its application."183 And when 
the Court perceives that it is incurring costs to its legitimacy by 
pursuing a doctrinal rule perceived to be political, we can expect 
the Court to abandon that rule and try something else.184 
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So it was with dual federalism. A doctrinal model that calls 
upon the Court to define and police separate and exclusive 
spheres of state and national authority puts enormous pressure 
on the Court's ability to draw the boundary line in a principled 
and consistent way.185 After a century and a half of trying to draw 
lines between commercial and police powers regulation,186 essen-
tially national and essentially local regulation,187 manufacturing 
and commerce,188 items in the "stream of commerce" and those 
without,189 and "direct" and "indirect" effects on interstate com-
merce,190 the Court found itself under fire for its inability to seem 
principled in that effort.191 Perhaps these doctrinal distinctions 
collapsed under their own weight, causing the Court to change 
course.192 Perhaps the perceived inconsistency of the Court's re-
sults helped mobilize popular support for President Roosevelt's 
"court-packing" plan, and the threat of that plan in turn caused 
the Court's "switch in time."193 Either way, the point is that the 
essential indeterminacy of the line between state and national 
spheres was a key factor in dual federalism's demise. 
If this is right, then at least as a historical matter, dual federalism 
did not die because there is anything fundamentally incoherent 
about the notion of state sovereignty or differing state conceptions 
of democracy or liberty. There is, then, no necessary impediment 
to alternative models of dual sovereignty that do not raise the 
same line-drawing problems.194 Moreover, if indeterminacy is the 
root problem with dual federalism, then that problem will afflict 
any dual federalist model, including one that restricts state power 
as much as one that restricts national power. The persistent nos-
talgia for exclusive zones of national power over areas like foreign 
affairs or immigration, then, remains puzzling. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Justice O'Connor said in A ^ York v. United States that "discerning 
the proper division of authority between the Federal Government 
and the States" is "our oldest question of constitutional law."195 But 
the persistence of that question should not blind us to the ways 
in which the federalism debate has changed over the course of 
our history. Although the dual federalist model dominated that 
debate for the first century and a half, it collapsed in 1937 and has 
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found few adherents since. Dual sovereignty remains, and a vari-
ety of other models for preserving the constitutional equilibrium 
between the nation and the states have arisen to take dual federal-
ism's place. But outside of a few pockets wherein the courts seek 
to maintain exclusive zones of national control over foreign affairs, 
immigration, and the like, dual federalism has given way to coop-
erative federalism, subsidiarity, process federalism, and sovereign 
immunity. 
I fear, however, that the puzzling persistence of dual federalism 
as an analytical category, particularly among critics of the Supreme 
Court's efforts to enforce constitutional constraints on national 
power, has distorted federalism's research agenda. We spend too 
much time discussing the follies of exclusive subject matter catego-
ries as a tool for dividing state and federal regulatory jurisdiction, 
and far too little analyzing the models of federalism that are actu-
ally in play. Any number of more fruitful projects call out for study: 
we are beginning to have some helpful analyses and case studies of 
the impact of political parties on the political safeguards of feder-
alism, for example, but much more remains to be done. Heather 
Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen's theoretical account of "unco-
operative federalism" called for careful analyses of the way that 
state and national administrators actually interact in practice, but 
relatively few have answered the call. And little has been done to 
bridge the gap between scholars of public administration steeped 
in the practical intricacies of fiscal federalism and legal scholars 
analyzing how to interpret the Spending Clause. 
Vestiges of dual federalism should be rooted out, and the Court 
should be warned against tendencies toward relapse. But for the 
most part, the horse of dual federalism is dead, and we should quit 
beating it. The more fundamental debate about dual sovereignty, 
however, remains worth having. 
NOTES 
I initially contributed this essay to the American Society for Political and 
Legal Philosophy's Annual Meeting, panel on "Federalism and Subsid-
iarity: Against Dual Federalism," which convened in August 2011, and I 
have revised it only slighdy in light of the Supreme Court's health care 
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and immigration decisions in June 2012.1 am grateful to Jim Fleming and 
Jacob Levy for inviting me to participate and to Sotirios Barber, whose 
paper "Defending Dual Federalism: A Self-Defeating Act" provides the 
focus for these comments. 
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